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1 Introduction zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
As is well -known, al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) was an excellent scholar in various sci- 
ences. Moreover, he is renowned for having combined several disciplines in new 
and ingenious ways, a fact expressed, for instance, by Marie Bernand by calli ng 
him "un artisan de la fusion des systernes de pensee" (1991). It thus seems legit- 
imate to expect that al-Ghazali would have something important to say about the 
combination of sciences which is at the centre of this volume, namely philoso- 
phy and jurisprudence, all the more as he wrote important works in both fields. 
On closer inspection, though, things turn out to be more complicated. There 
are good reasons to suppose that his contribution to jurisprudence, or rather to 
the relation between jurisprudence and philosophy, does not really match his 
accomplishments in other domains. When we zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAtalk about Sufis , for instance, 
it is obvious that his approach was innovative, if not revolutionary, combining 
classical Sufism with elements taken from other disciplines, in particular philos- 
ophy. Moreover, al-Ghazali himself stressed the original character of his writings 
on Sufism, entitling the most important amongst them The Revival of the 
Reli gious Sciences zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA([!:,ya' 'ulum a/-din).1 The same applies to theology. In this 
case, his works may have been more conventional than in Sufism, but his impact 
on the field was nonetheless considerable and in many respects innovative. This 
has already been emphasised by Muslim historiographers such as Ibn Khaldun 
(d. 808/1406) (1958a, 3:27-43, esp. 41; 1958b, 3:34-55, esp. 52),2 and it is con- 
firmed by modern scholarship which has long focused on al-Ghazali's accom- 
plishments in kalam and philosophy, producing numerous articles and passion- 
ate debates on the topic.zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA3 
When it comes to jurisprudence, however, the situation is different. Of 
course, al-Ghazali 's contribution to this field has been acknowledged, too, but zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1 Al-Ghazali's reflections on Sufism (and philosophy) have been discussed regularly in modern 
scholarship. See among many others the recent publications by Gianotti 2001; Treiger 2012; 
Abrahamov 2015. 
2 See also lbn Khaldun 1958a, 3:113-116; 1958b, 3:143-146. 
3 Among the numerous publications which could be mentioned in this respect see in particular 
Frank 1992, 1994; Griffel 2009; Shihadeh 2016a; Rudolph forthcoming. 
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it has never raised the same kind of enthusiasm among scholars, either in the 
Muslim tradition or in modern academia. lbn Khaldun, to quote him again, 
has devoted just one line to al-Ghazali when describing the science of "the prin- 
ciples of jurisprudence" zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(u$111 al-fiqh) i  his Muqaddima (1958a, 3:22; 1958b, 
3:28-29). In the chapter on "jurisprudence" (fiqh) he does not even mention 
his name (1958a, 3:1-14; 1958b, 3:3 - 23). Modern scholars, in their turn, pay 
more attention to al-Ghazali 's accomplishments in both fields but their output 
on the matter is limited, too. To ill ustrate this it may suffi ce to call to mind 
the two volumes on Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazali, recently 
edited by Georges Tamer and Frank Griffel in commemoration of his 900th anni- 
versary. They contain numerous articles dealing with Sufism, theology, and phi- 
losophy but not a single chapter on jurisprudence, let alone its relationship to 
philosophy (Tamer 2015; Griffel 2016). 
As compared to other topics, al-Ghazali's reflections on philosophy and 
jurisprudence seem thus to be less prominent and less striking. So far, they 
have neither been at the centre of interest nor generated any extensive academic 
debate. As a consequence, my own contribution will not focus on a specifi c, dis- 
puted problem. I will rather try to give a general outline of the topic and the main 
questions which are at stake. In order to do so, three points will be raised under 
the headings of "Philosophy and Jurisprudence", "Logic and Jurisprudence", 
and "Philosophical Ethics and Jurisprudence" before arriving at a final section 
in which we will look at a fif teenth century scholar who seems to have taken 
al-Ghazali's project further than al-Ghazali did himself. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
2 Philosophy and Jurisprudence - or: 
the Theoretical Background of the Topic 
First we have to examine how al-Ghazali conceived of philosophy and jurispru- 
dence and how he connected them to each other and to further disciplines. This 
is a question about taxonomy and the classifi cation of sciences to be answered 
by looking into the texts which he has especiall y devoted to this topic. As a mat- 
ter of fact, al-Ghazali liked classifying the sciences. He has written no fewer than 
eight times on this matter. The series of presentations starts with Maqasid al- 
falasifa (The Intentions of the Philosophers), continues with Fadii 'iti al- 
Batiniyya (The Disgraces of the Batinites), Iawahir al-Our'an (The Jewels of the 
Qur'an), Il:zya' 'ulum al-din containing two classifi cations, Mfzan al-iamal (The 
Scale of Action) including another two, and finall y ends with al-Mustasfa min 
A l-Ghazali on Philosophy and Jurisprudence - zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA69 
'ilm al-usul zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(The Distillation of t e Science of the Principles [of Jurisprudence]).4 
Each of these different taxonomies reveals a certain facet of his approach to 
the topic, but for our purpose it is suffi cient to examine two of them: the classi- 
fication given in Book One of the Ihva', that is, the Ki tab al-'Ilm (The Book of 
Knowledge), and the one given in the Musta$fa. The fi rst classification is the 
most elaborate ever presented by al-Ghazali, the second the only one given in 
a work on jurisprudence, which makes it particularly interesting for us. 
To begin with the Kitiib al- 'Ilm:5 as al-Ghazali explains in this book, there are 
two classes of sciences which are incumbent on the community as a whole (far4 
al-kifaya), one of them being zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(I) the non-religious (g ayr shar'iyya) and the other 
(II) the religious (shar'iyya) sciences. The fi rst class, that is, the non-religious sci- 
ences, can be divided into three categories: (1) praiseworthy disciplines 
(mahmuda) such as medicine, mathematics, and politics (siytisa); (2) blamewor- 
thy disciplines tmadnmumai such as magic and the science of talismans; and (3) 
permissible disciplines (mubti~) such as poetics and history. In contrast to that, 
all religious sciences are praiseworthy, at least in principle, because they are 
"learned from the prophets." In practice, it may have happened that scholars 
have introduced some doubtful and blameworthy elements into these disci- 
plines, too (al-Ghazali 1403/1982, 1:16.7-23, 2009, 59- 60 (French)). 
The praiseworthy among the religious sciences comprise a whole range of 
disciplines, presented by al-Ghazali in a complex order of categories and subdi- 
visions. The fi rst category (1) is constituted by sciences dealing with the princi- 
ples or sources (u$ii/), that is, the Qur'an, the Sunna of the Prophet, the consen- 
sus of the community (ijma'), and the traditions of the Prophet's companions 
(athar al-sahdba). The second (2) comprises the sciences of the branches 
(furii ') which are divided into (a) the science of this world ('ilm al-dunytu, namely 
jurisprudence (fiqh), and (b) the science of the path to the hereafter ('ilm tariq al- 
akhira). The latter is subdivided into (i) the science of unveili ng ('ilm al- 
mukasnafu), which is the knowledge of the righteous (al-$iddfqiin) and those 
close to God (al-muqarrabiin), essentiall y the apex of the sciences tghiiya: al- 
'uliim), according to al-Ghazali, and (ii) the science of [right] practice ('ilm a/- 
mu 'amala), also called the science of the states of the heart ('ilm a~wal a/- 
qalb ), which constitutes the topic of the !~ya'. The third category (3) deals 
with preliminaries (muqaddimtit) such as lexicography (lugha) and grammar 
(na~w); the fourth category (4) with supplementary disciplines (mutammimtit), zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
4 An overview of these classifications with special attention to the "science of unveil ing" ('ilm 
al-mukasnafai is given by Treiger 2011. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5 For the following, see Table 1 in the Appendix. Compare Treiger 2011, 6- 10. 
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including again a number of divisions and subdivisions. This time the main divi- 
sion is into (a) sciences related to the Qur'an and (b) sciences related to the 
Sunna. The former are subdivided into (i) disciplines dealing with the expression zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(laf?) of the Qur'an like the Qur'anic readings (qira'at) and letters (~uruf) and (ii) 
disciplines dealing with its meaning (ma'na) such as exegesis (tafsfr) and nota 
bene the principles of jurisprudence (w;iil). The latter comprise the science of 
the transmitters ('ilm al-rijaO and again the principles of jurisprudence (u$iil 
al-fiqh) because the Sunna is, next to the Qur'an, the most important source of 
Islamic law (al-Ghazall 1403/1982, 1:16.23 -17.15, 2009, 60 - 62 (French)). 
All in all , the classification is sophisticated, and it is admittedly interesting 
and instructive, but does not appear to supply the information we would actually 
like to have. In particular, the text says not a word about philosophy nor about 
theology, which is surprising, to say the least, in a classification including non- 
religious as well as religious sciences. 
Al-Ghazali must have been aware of these diffi culties for, having finished his 
presentation, he adds some further information. It concerns partly the absence of 
theology, partly the absence of philosophy within the classification, both expla- 
nations being of interest for us. Regarding theology, we are told that its main 
arguments are already to be found in the Qur'an and the Sunna. Apart from 
that, theology has nothing to offer but dialectical exercise and the inclination 
to quarrel with opponents. Therefore, kalam may be helpful in protecting the 
community against the sophistries of heretics and unbelievers, but it is certainly 
not the right way to obtain knowledge about God's essence and His attributes 
(al-Ghazali 1403/1982, 1:22.4-13, 2009, 74-75 (French)).6 Regarding philosophy, 
al-Ghazali's assessment is even harsher. As he tells us, it does not constitute a 
science in its own right ('ilm bi-ra'siha), but a conglomerate of four genuinely dif- 
ferent disciplines. These are (1) mathematics, (2) logic, that is, the investigation 
of proofs and definitions, which is actually part of theology, according to al-Gha- 
zall, (3) metaphysics (ilahiyyat), that is, the investigation of God's essence and 
attributes, which he also considers to be part of theology, and (4) physics 
(tabi'iyyat). The latter aims at investigating the material bodies and as such 
may be compared to medicine, but medicine is indispensable for humans 
whereas physics is not (al-Ghazali 1403/1982, 1:22.13- 24, 2009, 75- 76 (French)). 
These explanations are astonishing and would certainly deserve a detailed 
discussion. Yet, for our purpose, it is suffi cient to realise that, despite their 
explicit character, they do not help us to answer the questions we have. It 
appears that the elaborate classification of the sciences presented in the Kitab zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
6 Compare al-Ghazali 1403/1982, 1:22.24- 24.14; 2009, 76- 80 (French). 
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al- 'Jim recognises logic as both legitimate and relevant to the religious sciences, 
including kalam and (u$D.l al-) fiqh. But apart from that, it is silent about the rela- 
tionship between philosophy and jurisprudence. This makes it all the more 
important to proceed to our next text. That is the Musta$[O. min 'ilm al-usul. 
Of course, the Musta$[ii. is not about the question of how to classify and 
organise the sciences. Nevertheless, it can be useful for our purpose, as it con- 
tains three pieces of information which might be relevant to us, one in the Exor- 
dium of the book iKhutbat al-kitii b), one in its Preface iSadr al-kitii b), the third 
one being the structure of the book itself. 
To start with the exordium:zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA7 as al-Ghazali explains at the very beginning, 
there are three classes of sciences: (I) the purely rational disciplines ('aqlf 
ma}:u;l); (II) the purely traditional disciplines (naqlf mahd), and (III) the disci- 
plines combining reason and revelation (ma izdawaja fihi al- 'aql wa'l-sam '), 
which are the most exalted of all. The examples given in this context are math- 
ematics and astronomy for the first class, haditl: and tafsir for the second, and 
fiqh as well as U$D.l al-fiqh for the third (al-Ghazali 1971, 9.5-14). 
Three pages later, al-Ghazali picks up the same topic, this time in the preface 
to his book. 8 Here we are told that the sciences are divided into two classes: (I) 
the rational sciences ( 'aqliyya) and (II) the religious sciences (dfniyya), both of 
which can be subdivided into universal and particular disciplines. In case of 
the religious sciences, (1) the universal disciplines are identified as theology 
(kalam) and the science of the hidden, also known as the science of the heart 
('ilm al-batinlal-qalb), whereas (2) the category of particular disciplines is consti- 
tuted by the sciences dealing with fiqh, U$i11 al-fi qh, haduh, and tafsir (al-Ghazali 
1971, 12.10 -13.8).9 
Another two pages later, al-Ghazali comes to explaining the structure of his 
book, 10 and there we learn that the Musta$[O. consists of an Introduction 
(Muqaddima) and four major parts. The Introduction is devoted to the epistemo- 
logical fundaments of the theoretical sciences tmadarik al- 'uliim ai-nazariyvai, 
whereas the four parts of the book deal with (I) legal assessments (al-aJ:ikam); 
(II ) the sources of legal assessments tusu! al-ahkam); (III ) the proofs for legal 
assessments (adillat al-ahkam); and (IV) the conditions for being a mujtahid 
(al-Ghazali 1971, 15.5-18.9). 
7 See Table 2 in the Appendix; compare Treiger 2011, 17. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
8 See Table 3 in the Appendix; compare Treiger 2011, 17. 
9 The long elaboration on kalam as presented by al-Ghazali in this context has been translated 
and analysed by Treiger 2011, 18-22. 
10 See Table 4 in the Appendix. 
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Again, one might wonder what all of this has to do with our topic. Through- 
out the introductory pages of the Mustasja, al-Ghazali does not mention philos- 
ophy nor does he refer to its relationship to jurisprudence. Despite this fact, how- 
ever, it is possible to establish a connection between these two realms 
proceeding from the passages just quoted. One approach would involve turning 
from al-Ghazali himself to the way later authors such as Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198) 
understood his text. As is well known, Ibn Rushd wrote an epitome of his book 
entitled Mukhtasar al-Mustasfa." Its main goal is to summarise the content of the 
Mustasf«. In doing so, lbn Rushd presents a keen analysis of the intentions 
expressed in the text, touching on both juridical and philosophical aspects. 
At the very beginning of his Mukhtasar, lbn Rushd discusses the classifica- 
tion of the sciences given by al-Ghazali, but not by simply repeating the same 
content in other words; his intention is rather to elucidate the background 
and the structure of al-Ghazali's argument by presenting his points and his 
reflections in a new arrangement. This arrangement runs as follows: in terms 
of their objects and their goals, we have to distinguish three classes of sciences. 
(I) The first investigates theoretical issues such as the existence of atoms or the 
question of whether the world has been created in time zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(~udilth al-'iilam). Con- 
sequently, its goal is to create reasoned beliefs (i'tiqiidiit) on these issues in our 
souls. (II) The second class is practical science which consists of two categories. 
One of them is dealing with universals such as legal assessments iat-ahkam), the 
sources of legal assessments (U$i11 al-ahkiim), and the conditions of being a 
mujtahid. The other one is devoted to particular questions such as the correct 
way of praying or fasting which can be summarised as the duties incumbent 
on every believer (al-farii'i<;i). (III ) The third and final class is the instrumental 
sciences. They deal with the rules (qawiinfn) and the conditions of how to obtain 
knowledge, among them the proofs (adilla) to be used in both classes mentioned 
before (Bou Aki 2015, 118.8-17 (Arabic), 119.17- 35 (French)). 
So far, the discourse has been about goals and objects. Ibn Rushd has char- 
acterised the sciences under discussion by referring to their subject-matters. 
However, we need not stay at this provisional point but can identify every science 
he alluded to, and this at two different levels. The first level is more or less self - 
explanatory because it remains within the conceptual framework of the religious 
sciences shared by the Mustasfa and the Mukhtasar. On this level, it is quite easy 
to identify the disciplines intended by Ibn Rushd when he mentions their respec- 
tive goals and objects. The theoretical science dealing with topics such as the 
11 The text has recently been edited and investigated by Ziad Bou Aki (2015). The following 
owes much to his observations. 
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generation of the world in time is to be identified with theology zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(kalam). The uni- 
versal practical science dealing with legal assessments and their sources can be 
equated with the principles of jurisprudence (w;ul zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAa/-fiqh). The particular practi- 
cal science dealing with our concrete duties corresponds to jurisprudence (fiqh). 
And the instrumental science dealing with the rules and the conditions of cog- 
nition is nothing but another part of the U$i11 al-fi qn, that is, the part which is 
devoted to the proofs of the legal assessments (adillat al-ahkiim). 
In addition to these assignments, there is yet another possibili ty of identify- 
ing the sciences which are at stake here. This becomes evident when we dispense 
with the level of religious disciplines and turn to the level of philosophy. Within 
the conceptual framework of philosophy, the correspondence between the 
objects of knowledge and their respective disciplines runs as follows - and 
this is confirmed by other texts written by lbn Rushd: the sciences dealing 
with God and the structure of this world are metaphysics and physics. The uni- 
versal practical science is ethics, the particular practical science politics, and the 
science dealing with the rules and the conditions of cognition cannot be but 
logic." 
As a result, there are two lists. Following Ibn Rushd we have recognised the 
parallels between rational and religious sciences and we have finally succeeded 
in establishing a relationship between philosophy and the principles of jurispru- 
dence. As it turned out, some parts of the U$i11 al-fiqh correspond to logic, 
whereas another part of it corresponds to philosophical ethics. I will therefore 
focus on these two issues in the following. 
3 Logic and Jurisprudence 
Of the aspects related to our topic, logic is probably the one which has received 
the bulk of scholarly attention (Brunschvig 1971; Hana 1974; Marmura 1975; al- 
' Ajam 1989; Street 2004, 555-559; Rudolph 2005; El-Rouayheb 2016, 411- 
416).13 Al-Ghazali himself promoted this interest by stressing the importance of 
Aristotelian logic in several contexts, the most prominent of them being probably 
the unconditioned appraisal of the science of logic in his autobiographical writ- zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
1 2 See Table 5 in the Appendix; compare Bou Aki 2015, 7-8 and the references to other texts by 
lbn Rushd given by Bou Aki 2015, 331- 332. 
13 Compare also the unpublished PhD dissertations by al-Sayyed Ahmad 1981 and Becheri 
2009. 
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ing, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAThe Deliverer from Error (al-Munqidh min al-<;lalal).zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA14 Furthe more, he wrote a 
number of introductory works on logic such as The Standard of Knowledge 
(Mi'yar al- 'ilm), The Touchstone for Speculation (Mibakk al-nazari, and the first 
part of the Mustasfa, not to mention The Straight Balance tat-Oistas al- 
mustaqfm), which is rather an apology of syllogistic reasoning than an exposi- 
tion of it.15 
The goal of these introductory writings was twofold. First, they were meant 
to explain the logical terminology al-Ghazali himself had used in The 
Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafut al-falasifa). This is one of the purposes 
explicitly mentioned in the preface to his Mi'yar al- 'ilm (al-Ghazali 1961, 60.7-9). 
Second and more important, they were supposed to teach religious scholars how 
to apply Aristotelian logic within their own disciplines. Apparently, al-Ghazali 
was convinced that everybody working in the religious sciences had to learn 
the methods of proof and the conditions of demonstration. This seems to be 
the reason why he explained these rules in more than one introductory writing 
and why his various explanations were situated on different intellectual levels. 
Mi'yar al-i lm, for instance, presents the important elements of Aristotelian 
logic in a detailed manner, using broadly philosophical terminology. In addition, 
its examples are often taken from metaphysical issues, which gives reason to 
believe that its addressees were mainly theologians. 16 By contrast, Mibakk al- 
n<1,?ar and the Introduction to the Mustasta (which heavily draws on the 
Mibakk) are confined to the basics of logic. They avoid philosophical language, 
replace it, if possible, by the terminology of the religious sciences, 17 and focus on 
examples taken from jurisprudence. In all probabili ty its addressees thus were 
the fuqaha'." zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
14 Containing sentences such as: "There is nothing in this [i.e. logic] which must be rejected. 
On the contrary, it is the sort of thing mentioned by the mutakallimiin and the partisans of rea- 
son (ah/ al-nC1-?ar) in connection with the proof they use" (al-Ghazali 1969, 22.13-14; McCarthy 
2000, 65 (English)). 
15 Edition of the text by Chelhot; for a short description of the contents, see Rudolph 2005, 
86- 88; compare also Kleinknecht 1972. 
16 This is confi rmed by the fact that the text was written immediately after and in close con- 
nection to the Tahafut; compare also my remarks in Rudolph 2005, 85. 
17 The relationship between philosophical and juridical terminology is explicitly addressed in 
the last chapter of the Mihakk: where al-Ghazali discusses various ways of defining hadd ("def- 
inition"), 'ilm ("knowledge"), 'arad ("accident"), hadith ("created in time"), mutadadd ("con- 
trary"), hayat ("li fe"), haraka ("motion"), and waiib ("necessary") (al-Ghazali 1994, 145-161; 
compare also al-Ghazall 1971, 31.9- 39.22). 
18 Additional evidence is given by the fact that al-Ghazali distinguishes in the Mihakk three 
types of scholars: the theologians (al-mutakallimiln), the logicians (al-mantiqiyyiln), and "us" 
Al-Ghazal! on Philosophy and Jurisprudence - zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA75 
The theoretical background of al-Ghazali's commitment to logic consists of 
two basic assumptions. One of them is his conviction that all kinds of valid 
proofs, as applied in the sciences, are nothing but variations of the same logical 
structure. Consequently, they all can be converted into their basic pattern which 
is the syllogistic form (Rudolph 2005, 77- 79, 89-90).19 The second assumption 
is even more general. According to al-Ghazali, syllogistic reasoning cannot be 
reduced to its scientific applications. In its basic elements, it is rather the com- 
mon way used by all human beings when they speculate and try to discover new 
insights. Thus he writes in Book 39 of the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAI~ ii ', that is, The Book about Thinking 
(Kitiib al-Taffakur): "The meaning of 'thinking' (ma'nii al-fikr) is to bring two 
pieces of knowledge into the heart [of a human being) in order to conclude a 
third piece of knowledge" (al-Ghazali 1403/1982, 4:425.16, 2012, 37).20 Afterwards, 
this definition is ill ustrated by a syllogism and repeated in several variations, all 
of them stressing its evidential and universal validity. 
As a consequence, every scholar should learn how to use syllogisms cor- 
rectly. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA1n order to do so, he should study ristotelian logic, which is the author- 
itative and unsurpassed presentation of syllogistic reasoning. By stressing this 
argument again and again, al-Ghazali established a link between logic and juris- 
prudence declaring the first to be an indispensable propaedeutics to the sec- 
ond. 21 However, his optimism concerning the learning abil ities of the juqana' 
and the actual applicabili ty of syllogisms to fiqh was not unconditional. On a 
close reading of his manuals on logic, one can find a couple of passages 
which come across as more sceptical and thus uncover the limits of his own 
methodological programme. 
One of these passages is a chapter devoted to the shortcomings of religious 
scholars. As al-Ghazali explains, many of them tend to use arguments which are 
neither correct nor reliable, for a variety of reasons. One is simply the scholars' 
lack of knowledge about methodological questions tqusur al- 'ilm) (al-Ghazali 
1994, 109.7, 1971, 62.15), another their tendency to mingle several types of argu- 
ments, thereby combining what should be kept strictly separate (al-Ghazali zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
(na/;lnu), that is, apparently, the [uqaha' (al-Ghazali 1994, 97.24-25; compare also al-Ghazali 
1971, 54.19- 20). 
19 The same conviction lies behind al-Ghazall's assumption that analogical argumentation is 
inconclusive unless it can be regimented into syllogistic form (El-Rouayheb 2016, 412). 
20 l 'lam anna ma'na al-fi kr huwa i/;l<;far ma'rifatayn fi 1-qalb li-yustathmara minhuma ma'rifa 
thaii tha. 
21 Al-'Ajam 1989, 93-99 emphasises that al-Ghazali used Aristotelian logic in order to enrich 
Islamic jurisprudence; compare also Said 2013, 78- 79. 
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1994, 109.9 -10, 1971, 62.16 -17). zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA22 The hird problem consists of the fact that 
many scholars treat the premises to be used in syllogisms in a careless and incor- 
rect way. Sometimes they do not reveal their premises, allegedly because they are 
evident zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(wa,M) (al-Ghazali 1994, 109.7- 8, 1971, 62.15).23 Sometimes they accept 
premises which are not proven at all but only generally accepted and well - 
known zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(mashhii.r) (al-Ghazali 1994, 108.6-9, 1971, 61:19- 21). And sometimes 
they even hide their premises in order to intentionally deceive ttalbis) their oppo- 
nents. This is due to the fact that religious scholars, as a rule, adhere to the doc- 
trines of their own school, trying to justify and defend them at any cost (al- 
Ghazali 1994, 109.8- 9, 1971, 62.16). 24 
The list of shortcomings which are common among scholars is long but it 
has to be completed by another problem. It does not concern the personal 
(in)capacities of the fuqahd' but the structure of their discipline, that is, jurispru- 
dence itself . Of course, jurisprudence is a science based on reasoning. As such it 
is open to methodological reflections as presented by al-Ghazali in the Mi'yar, 
the Mil}akk, and the Mustasia. However, jurisprudence and in particular its sour- 
ces cannot be submitted to rationalisation in every respect as they include ele- 
ments which are based on tradition and have to be accepted necessarily, even 
if they are not compatible with philosophical logic. 
One of the diffi culties to be mentioned in this context is the status of the 
propositions used in jurisprudence. Most of them have to be taken from the 
Qur'an and the Sunna, both of which constitute the uncontroversial material 
sources of Islamic law. As a consequence, many premises accepted by the 
fuqaha' are not compatible with the rules of demonstrative logic. They are nei- 
ther universally valid nor do they meet the conditions of certainty (yaqfn), 25 
which would be the prerequisites of being a premise in a demonstrative syllo- 
gism. Instead, jurists often argue on the basis of propositions which are nothing 
but commonly accepted (mashhurat), adopted from trustworthy people 
22 Compare also al-Ghazali 1994, 111.11-ult.; 1971, 64.1-8. 
23 Compare also al-Ghazali 1994, 109.13-110.l; 1971, 62.17-63.5. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
24 Compare also al-Ghazali 1994, 110.1-111.11; 1971, 63.5-64.l. 
25 According to al-Ghazali (1994, 102-108; 1971, 57-62), who follows essentially al-Farabl and 
Avicenna in this respect, six classes of premises can be characterised as certain (yaqfn): (1) pri- 
mary propositions (awwaliyyat) such as the axiom of contradiction; (2) self-perceptions 
(mushahadat batina) as, for instance, "I am hungry"; (3) sense perceptions (mai)siisat ;ahira) 
as, for instance, "Salt is white"; (4) experiences (tajribiyyat) as, for instance, "Fire is burning"; 
(5) safe traditions (mutawatirat) as, for instance, "Mecca exists"; (6) indubitable conceptions of 
the imaginative faculty (wahmiyyat) as, for instance, "A body has six sides" (meaning: it has 
three dimensions). Compare also al-Ghazali 1961, 186-193 where the classification and the ter- 
minology are slightly different. For al-Farabi's treatment of the topic, see Black 2006. 
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(maqbii.lat) or expressing a wide-spread belief (m~nii.nt:it) (al-Ghazali 1961, 
193.7-198.18). More than that: they are actually justified to do so because pre- 
ponderant belief (zrmn) is all that is needed in the legal sciences (al-fiqhiyyat) 
in contrast to the rational sciences (al- 'aqliyyat) which have to be based on cer- 
tain premises (al-Chazali 1961, 176.7-177.12). 
Another diffi culty applies to the argument which is at the core of legal rea- 
soning, that is, analogy or the qiyas of the [uqaha', As mentioned above, al- 
Ghazali was convinced that it can be converted into a syllogism. As a conse- 
quence, he acknowledged its general validity and assumed it to be equivalent 
to philosophical logic, at least in theory. When it comes to practice, however, 
al-Ghazali adds an important quali fication. According to him, jurists at work 
should not refer to syllogisms but keep analogy as the standard form of their rea- 
soning. Apparently, this fits better to the requirements of Islamic law, which is 
based not upon universally valid premises but particular propositions. 
The point is explained in a chapter of the Mi'yar entitled "The Paradigm" (al- 
tamthfl) (al-Ghazali 1961, 165-177). zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA26 It inve tigates the analogy of the jurists (al- 
qiyas al-fiqhf) as well as the inference from the visible to the invisible ial-istiduil 
bi'l-ehahid 'ala l-gha'ib and radd al-ghii 'ib 'ala l-shiihid, respectively) commonly 
used in Islamic theology. Both of them correspond formaliter to the argument 
called "paradigm" (tamthfl) in the Aristotelian tradition. This had already been 
demonstrated by Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. 339/950 or 951)27 whose logical writings 
were in more than one respect a source of inspiration for al-Ghazali (Street 2004, 
559). As a matter of fact al-Ghazali follows al-Farabi in equating the qiyas of the 
jurists and the istidlai of the theologians with the tamthil of the philosophers (al- 
Ghazali 1961, 165.8-10). Furthermore, he insists on the fact that all three of them 
can be converted into syllogistic form.28 Yet, in practice, his advice is nuanced. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
26 The chapter has been analysed by El-Rouayheb 2016, 412-414 (who refers to a different edi- 
tion of the Mi'yar). The following remarks of mine are heavil y indebted to his observations and 
results. 
27 The topic is discussed in the last two chapters of al-Farabi's Short Book on the Syllogism 
(Kitab al-Qiyas al-~aghir), also known as Short Summary of Logic as Practiced by the 
Theologians (al-Mukhta$ar al-saghir ff 1-mantiq 'ala tariqat a/-mutakal/imin). The Arabic text is 
available in two editions, one of them prepared by Danishpazhuh and the other one by al- 
' Ajam (who erroneously printed these two chapters at the end of another book by al-Farabl, 
that is, his Kitab [or: al-Madkhal ila] al-Qiyas). An English translation is given by Rescher 
1963. For a short description of the work, see Rudolph 2017, 557-558. A detailed examination 
of al-Farabi's analysis of the tamthil, the istidla), and the qiyas fiqhi is to be found in Lameer 
1994, 40-42, 176-258. 
28 For the examples given in the Mi'yar, see below. Another important source would be al- 
Ghazali's The Balanced Book of What-to-Believe iai-Iqtisad ff l-i 'tiqad'; which contains a number 
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While recommending the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmutakallimiin to actually make use of syllogisms in 
their writings, he tells the [uqaha' that they would do better to stick with their 
traditional analogical arguments instead of replacing them by syllogisms. 
This advice is ill ustrated by several concrete examples. The first example 
raises an issue often discussed in Islamic theology, that is, the question of 
whether - or rather, for which reason - we may assume that the heavens are 
not eternal but created in time. The traditional argument used by the 
mutakallimun in this respect is an istidlal running as follows: "The heavens 
are created in time since they are composite bodies like animals and plants 
and these are created in time" (al-Ghazall 1961, 165.14-15).29 Yet, this argument 
is inconclusive, as al-Ghazali explains. Presented in this form, its validity 
depends on the assumption that being composite is the "cause" of the judge- 
ment that animals and plants are created in time. This assumption, in its tum, 
can only be taken for granted if we know for sure that anything composite 
(including animals and plants) must be created in time. The crucial element of 
the entire proof is thus the universal premise "Everything composite is created 
in time." Yet, if this is the case, we should mention it explicitly by constructing 
a different argument. This argument should be a demonstrative syllogism in the 
first figure running as follows: "The heavens are composite. Everything compo- 
site is created in time. The heavens are created in time." Presented in this form, 
our proof has become conclusive, according to al-Ghazali , Hence it follows that 
syllogisms are superior to traditional analogies as far as theological issues are 
concerned (al-Ghazali 1961, 165.16-166.2). 30 
The case is different when it comes to juridical issues. This is ill ustrated by 
another example raising the famous problem whether - or rather, for which rea- 
son - consuming date wine is prohibited. Traditionally, the prohibition was jus- 
tifi ed by an analogy. It can be formulated in various ways, one of them being: "If 
we know that grape wine (khamr) is prohibited and we have a preponderant 
belief (,?"ann) that the cause ('ilia) for the prohibition is that it is intoxicating, 
then we are justified in concluding that date wine (nabfdh), which is also intox- 
icating, is also prohibited.'?' In principle, this zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAqi as can be tra sformed into  
categorical syllogism just like the theological istidlal mentioned before. The 
appropriate syllogism would run something like "Every date wine is an intoxi- 
cant. Every intoxicant is prohibited. Every date wine is prohibited" (al-Ghazali 
of categorical syllogisms serving as arguments in the theological discussion; compare zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAm  pre- 
liminary remarks on the topic in Rudolph 2005, 88- 91. 
29 Compare El-Rouayheb 2016, 412. 
JO  Compare El-Rouayheb 2016, 412. 
31 The wording is taken from El-Rouayheb 2016, 413; compare al-Ghazali 1961, 171.17. 
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1994, 90.9 -10, 1971, 50.1- 2), zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA32 which seems to be p rfect, at least on formal 
grounds. In this case, however, al-Ghazali prefers keeping the analogical form 
of the argument. Obviously, he is convinced that, whereas syllogistic reasoning 
fits better to theological issues, the qiyas is better adapted to the requirements 
of legal decisions. One reason might be that when it comes to juridical matters 
like the prohibition of consuming wine, analogical reasoning is more explicit 
and more transparent: it mentions all the relevant elements of the argument 
including its root zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(a$/) and the judgement (J:iukm) attributed to the root. In con- 
trast to that, the syllogism omits both the root and its judgement replacing them 
by an allegedly universal premise ("Every intoxicant is prohibited"), the status of 
which is not actually confirmed. 
We may thus conclude that the connection between logic and jurisprudence 
as established by al-Ghazali is less firm than we might have expected. In this 
respect his goal seems to have been theoretical rather than practical. The 
fuqaha' should know the general rules of Aristotelian logic but they were not 
expected to apply them to every legal question. All in all it appears very likely 
that al-Ghazal! deemed the ties between zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmantfq and fiqh to be l ss strong 
than those between mantiq and kalam. He is not very explicit on this point 
but his reason may have been that jurisprudence was an area where preponder- 
ant belief and non-certain premises were suffi cient, whereas theology, seeking 
knowledge of God and His creation, was viewed as a rational science ('ilm 
'aqii) striving for certainty (El-Rouayheb 2016, 414).33 
4 Philosophical Ethics and Jurisprudence 
As mentioned before, Ibn Rushd was convinced that there are structural paral- 
lels between U$Ul al-fiqti and philosophical ethics. It thus seems appropriate to 
examine these parallels by asking what al-Ghazali has to say about them. The 
best way to do so appears to be to address his major writings in these two fields, 
that is, the Musta$[ii in jurisprudence and the Mfzan al- 'amal in ethics. In both 
cases, we want to know if they contain reflections and arguments referring to the 
field of the other. So, we will ask whether al-Ghazali discusses issues of ethics in 
the Mustasfa and issues of jurisprudence in the Mzzan. 
To start with the latter: as an attentive reading of the Mfzan reveals, the term 
fiqh is actually mentioned several times within the book. However, none of these zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
32 Compare EI-Rouayheb 2016, 413. 
33 Compare al-Ghazali's entire discussion of the fiqhiyytit at 1961, 170.22-177.12. 
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passages gives us a systematic account of what jurisprudence actually is and 
what its relationship to ethics might be. They rather consist of scattered remarks 
about zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfiqh and about the fuqahd', some of which seem to be completely acciden- 
ta! whereas others betray an ironic, if not extremely critical, tone. 
To give just two examples: in one passage of the Mizdn, fiqh is assigned to 
the sphere of politics, that is, the art of governing people zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(siyasa). This was 
the usual way of locating it, as we have already been told by lbn Rushd. Yet, 
al-Ghazali for his part adds a further qualification to this general statement. 
According to him, the fuqaha' as well as the theologians, who are called 
wu " ti?' ("preachers") in this context, are only in the position to govern ordinary 
people (al- 'awamm). The governance of the eli te ial-khawass) cannot be their 
task but must be delegated to real scholars and sages (al- 'ulamti' wa'/- 
hukama ') (al-Ghazali 1964, 329.17-18, 2006, 184 (German)). 
The second critique goes in the same direction. It focuses on the question of 
how we obtain knowledge and whether knowledge is attainable by everybody 
and in any scientific discipline. Here again, al-Ghazali's position is very clear. 
For him, real insight is only accessible to those who have cleansed their souls 
and opened their minds in order to understand the intell igible structure of the 
world and the divine reali ties ial-haqa'iq al-iidhiyya) (al-Ghazali 1964, 218.ult.- 
219.4, 2006, 109 (German)). Throughout the Mfzan, this way of gaining knowledge 
is stressed by him,34 which demonstrates that the epistemology presented in this 
text combines both Sufi convictions and philosophical elements.35 As a conse- 
quence, the knowledge al-Ghazali is talking about is not attainable by jurists; 
their arguments can at best play a secondary role in this context. This is illus- 
trated by two plays on words, obviously meant to mock the doctors of law 
and their ignorance. The first says that the fuqahii ' often teach persons who pos- 
sess more insight (afqah) than themselves (al-Ghazali 1964, 220.12, 2006, 110). 
The second affi rms that everybody who makes just a little effort (ai-qali ! bi'l- 
iitihad) in order to obtain real knowledge will easily surpass the muitahidun, 
that is, the official representatives of ijtihad (al-Ghazall 1964, 219.11, 2006, 109). 
In short, when writing the Mfaan al- 'amal, al-Ghazali was not interested in 
connecting ethics and jurisprudence. Whatever he says about fiqh or U$Ul a/- 
fiqh in this book demonstrates that he did not consider it the right way to exam- 
ine ethical problems and to form our character, both of which are the goals of 
34 Compare, for instance, al-Ghazali 1964, 240-246; 2006, 126-129 and al-Ghazal! 1964, 251- 
254; 2006, 133-135. 
35 For a general introduction to al-Ghazali's ethics, see Sherif 1975. The fact that Mfziin al- 'amal 
presents both philosophy and Sufism as paths to the highest felicity has often been stressed, 
recently by Garden 2015, 210-228 and Mohamed 2015, 188-193; compare also Said 2013, 92-113. 
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akhlaq. This is confi rmed by another passage from the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMfzan worth mention n  
here. It deals with the fundamental question of all ethics, namely: "How can we 
know what is good and what is bad?" Al-Ghazali's answer refers to neither the 
Qur'an nor to legal assessments but simply to human intell ect. As he explains, 
it is our intell ect that enables us to solve this problem and to distinguish what 
has to be distinguished, namely "true" and "false" in propositions or beliefs 
(al-haqq wa'l-bati l fi i-i 'tiqadii t), sincerity and lies in speech tai-sidq wa'l-kidhb 
fi l-maqiil ), and "good" and "bad" in our acts ial-jamil wa'l-qabih fi l-a]' al) (al- 
Ghazan 1964, 233.7-10, 2006, 120-121).36 
Having arrived at this point we have to admit that the results obtained so far 
do not encourage us to continue our investigation. What al-Ghazali explains in 
the Mfzan seems to exclude any serious relationship between the science of eth- 
ics and usul al-fi qh. However, we still have to cross-check this result by turning to 
other writings and changing our perspective. So, our last question is whether the 
Mustasta contains anything relevant about ethics. 
Unsurprisingly, the answer is no. Throughout the Mustasfa, al-Ghazali does 
not address ethical questions, at least not in an expli cit manner. The only excep- 
tion to be mentioned in this context is a section from the fi rst part of the book 
discussing the nature and the constituent elements of legal assessments 
(ahkam) (al-Ghazali 1971, 69-80; Reinhart 1995, 87-104 (English)). This section 
was examined, some years ago, in a book by A. Kevin Reinhart entitled zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBABefore 
Revelation. 37 As we learn from his book, it was part of a lengthy controversy in 
Muslim religious thought focusing on the problem of how we know about 
moral judgements. The controversial question which was at stake can be sum- 
marised as foll ows: what is the assessment (if any) for useful and benefi cial 
human acts before revelation comes to assign their value? Are useful acts before 
revelation proscribed, permitted, obli gatory, or something else (Reinhart 1995, 
29 - 31, 38, 62)?38 
In principle, this question is highly relevant in the context of philosophical 
ethics. However, the way al-Ghazali discusses it in the Mustasfa ignores this rele- 
vance, and that for two reasons: fi rst, throughout the section devoted to this 
question he does not mention philosophy. All his arguments, objections, and ex- 
planations remain within the conceptual framework of jurisprudence and 
36 For the Arabic reception of the late ancient motto that logic is a tool for distinguishing true 
from false and good from bad, see Adamson 2011. 
37 The most relevant passages are to be found in Reinhart 1995, 70-75, 115-117. Reinhart's 
analysis of al-Ghazali's arguments is diligent and convincing despite the scholarly debate pro- 
voked by his book (see Ormsby 1998, 1999; Reinhart 1999). 
38 Compare Ormsby 1998, 119. 
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Islamic theology, his main opponents apparently being the school of the Mu'ta- 
zila." Second, al-Ghazali's position in the Mustasfi: is completely different from 
what he had advocated in the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMfztin. Furthermore, e nowhere mentions these 
differences explicitly nor does he try to discuss the reasons behind them. 
This is not the place for a detailed description of the arguments given in the 
Mustasia. They are extensively discussed by Reinhart"? and can easily be fol- 
lowed in his translation of the relevant passages of the Arabic text. In our con- 
text, it suffi ces to say that al-Ghazali, in the Mustasfa, maintains an orthodox 
Ash'ari position. According to this position, any kind of moral assessments 
must be based on revelation because our intellect, although having some 
vague estimations of what might be recommended and what is to be avoided 
(arising from our self-interest) (Reinhart 1995, 171), 41 is not able to decide inde- 
pendently what is right and what is wrong. This is expressed in a whole series 
of affi rmations and arguments, including the following particularly unequivocal 
statement: "Therefore we say: the intellect neither commends nor detests nor 
does it make thanking the benefactor obligatory nor is there any assessment 
for acts before the arrival of the revelation" (al-Ghazali 1971, 69.10-11).42 zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
5 Final Remarks: al-Ghazal! and Beyond 
This result is surprising to say the least. The same scholar who told us that every- 
body should follow the universally valid rules of Aristotelian logic and that our 
intellect enables us to distinguish between "good" and "bad" ends up with a 
statement on the intellect (and thus on rationali ty) which seems to be opposite, 
if not contradictory, to what he himself affi rmed elsewhere. Of course, there may 
be several ways of explaining the manifest differences between al-Ghazali's 
statements. One way, for instance, would be to suppose that his views on the 
topic developed during his li fetime.43 As far as we know, he wrote the Mfztin 
39 Al-Ghazali's discussion in the Mustasfti focuses on the positions and the arguments of the 
Mu'tazila: see Reinhart 1995, 88, 90 -95, 97, 101, 103. Apart from the Mu'tazil ls he mentions 
the Ash'aris as well as the Hanbalis, but not a single philosopher. 
40 See the arguments summarised by Reinhart 1995, 71-75. 
41 Compare Said 2013, 83. 
42 Fa-/i-hiidhii qulna al- 'aql Iii yuhassinu wa-la yuqabbihu wa-lii yujibu shukr al-mun 'im wa-ld 
hukm li'l-afiil qab/a wuriid al-shar'. Compare the English translation by Reinhart 1995, 87. 
43 The developmental hypothesis which has a long history in scholarship has been stressed 
again recently by Madelung 2015 and Garden 2015, 208-210, 227-228. 
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in 488/1095, whereas the Mustasft: was finished nearly fifteen years later.44 It is 
thus not impossible that his ideas may have changed during all these years.45 
Another possibil ity to explain the divergence would be to say that he adapted 
his doctrine to the audience he was addressing. As we have seen, he considered zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
fiqh only to be the right way of governing ordinary people, whereas the eli te 
should be guided by real scholars and sages zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(al- 'ulama' wa't-hu ama'i (El- 
Rouayheb 2016, 414).46 We could thus argue that the Mustasf« contains the doc- 
trine for the 'awamm, whereas the Mizan, addressing the khawass, must argue 
on a different level.47 In either case, however, we cannot help conceding that zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
44 Although there is still some debate about the time of origin of the A11Zlin, most scholars agree 
that it was written in 488/1095 as a sequel to the Mi'yar and earlier than the Il:,ya' (Bouyges 1959, 
28- 29; Treiger 2012, 12; Garden 2015, 208- 209). In the case of the Musta$/11 we know for sure 
that it originated in 503/1109. Several manuscripts and Ibn Khall ikan's testimony confi rm that 
the text was completed on 6 Muharram 503/5 August 1109 (Bouyges 1959, 73-74; Treiger 2013, 
14). 
45 However, when we follow the developmental hypothesis assuming that the doctrine of the 
Mfzan was superseded in later writings, we face a problem: there may be some evidence that 
the Mizan "shows al-Ghazali in a very different frame of mind" than the one depicted in later 
texts (Garden 2015, 208- 209), but it would be extremely diffi cult to argue that the entire ethical 
doctrine as exposed in it was superseded later on. Several parts of the 11:,ya' draw heavily on the 
Mfzan (see in particular Kitab 'Aja'ib al-qalb [Book 21] and Kittib Riyadat al-nafs [Book 22]). And 
even at-Munqidh min al-dalal, written probably in 501/1107 (Bouyges 1959, 70-71; compare 
Treiger 2012, 14 who assumes a slightly earlier date of origin), is in some respect close to the 
ideas of the Mfzan. The famous passage at the beginning of the Munqidh where al-Ghazalt 
describes his doubts and his quest for an indisputable foundation of all knowledge (see Rudolph 
2018, 4-11 with further references) can be interpreted as a distant echo of the very last sentences 
of the Mizan which run as follows: "Those who do not doubt do not reflect. Those who do not 
reflect do not see. And those who do not see remain in blindness and error" (al-Ghazali 1964, 
409.21- 22; 2006, 238 (German): fa-man lam yashukk lam yalJ.?Ur wa-man lam yalJ.?Ur lam 
yab$ur wa-man lam yab$ur baqiya [i l-tama wa'l-daldl), 
46 Compare above n. 33. 
47 When following this hypothesis we face the problem of how to explain the confli cting state- 
ments about the 'aql to be found in the Mfzan and in the Musta$/11. One solution would be that 
the word 'aql which is equivocal was used in different ways by al-Ghazall. In the Musta$[11 he 
argues against the Mu'tazila and their understanding of moral reasoning. ln this context 'aql 
could be rendered as "reason" (which would fi t the doctrine of the Mu'tazila) meaning a purely 
human capacity as opposed to sense perception. According to al-Ghazali, this capacity is not 
able to really distinguish between "good" and "bad" because it lacks divine assistance and is 
always restrained to self-interest. In contrast, the argument of the A1zzan seems to be developed 
within the philosophical tradition. ln this context, 'aql may best be rendered as "intellect" 
meaning a faculty shared by human beings and several higher entities (that is, the cosmic intel- 
lects and ultimately God) and thus transcending the realm of anthropology. Endowed with this 
faculty, humans are supposed to have access to knowledge about "true" and "false" as well as 
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the connection between zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfalsafa and tusu! al-) fiqh as sta lished by al-Ghazali is 
precarious. Regardless of how we explain the diff erence between his philosoph- 
ical reflections as presented in the zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAMfzan and his legal reasoning as presented in 
the Mustasfa, the fact remains that there is a considerable diff erence between the 
two which cannot be bridged by rhetorical efforts. 
In sum, we thus have to admit that al-Ghazali's contribution to our topic was 
rather limited and oddly vague. It is true, he identified the major points of con- 
vergence between philosophy and jurisprudence, or logic and ethics (including 
the theory of intellect). Furthermore, he was working on these points in particu- 
lar when reflecting on the relation between Aristotelian logic and legal reason- 
ing. Despite these eff orts, however, al-Ghazali did not succeed in establishing 
a systematic and consistent link between the two disciplines. This applies to 
the field of logic where he taught syllogisms but preferred using analogies 
when it came to juridical reasoning. And it applies to the domain of ethics 
and noetics where he presented his readers with confli cting statements about 
the role of the intell ect (al- 'aql) . 
Does this mean that our investigation ends up with a conclusion which is 
entirely negative, if not frustrating? Although it may seem so at fi rst sight, this 
is not necessaril y the case. At least not if we are ready to enlarge our perspective, 
and go beyond the scope of questions which have been asked so far. Until now, 
we have mainly focused on al-Ghazali's own achievements by foll owing what he 
has expressed in his own writings. There is, however, another possible approach 
to our topic, and the example of Ibn Rushd's Mukhtasar al-Mustasfa given above 
has already shown that this approach may be successful. It does not focus on 
what al-Ghazali himself has written but on what he has initiated by his writings. 
In other words, it asks for his impact on the field and his possible influence on 
later refl ections about philosophy and jurisprudence. 
Seen from this angle, the picture changes considerably. Without elaborating 
systematicall y on our topic, al-Ghazali seems to have opened a gate to it, thereby 
inciting other authors to go further in this direction. This is at least the impres- 
sion we get when reading later works on U$i11 al-fi qh, for they include numerous 
passages discussing philosophical issues both in logic and in the field of ethics 
and noetics. As far as logic is concerned, this is easil y demonstrated. From the 
sixth/twelfth century onward, many influential fuqaha' such as Ibn Oudama 
(d. 620/1223), Sayf al-Din al-Amidi (d. 631/1233), and Ibn al-Hajib (d. 646/1248) 
"good" and "bad." The only requirement would be that they cleanse their souls and thereby ena- 
ble their intellects to be enlightened from "above" which is more or less the thematic focus of the 
M°1Z11n. 
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introduced Aristotelian logic into legal theory, thereby foll owing the example of 
al-Ghazali's Mustasfa. Thus a long tradition of logical studies emerged amongst 
Islamic jurists, which was admittedly not uncontested but remained one of the 
characteristic features of later usul al-fi qn works.48 
When it comes to ethics and noetics, the situation is diff erent. In their case, 
it is more diffi cult to discern al-Ghazali's impact on the field. This is all the more 
true as the study of these topics and their possible interaction with legal reason- 
ing, in particular in the later period, is not even in its infancy. There is, however, 
an interesting textual example worth mentioning here. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAIt cannot be assigned to 
al-Ghazali directly but might be related in some way to the intell ectual activiti es 
initiated by him. It reveals that later jurists accepted the integration of philo- 
sophical noetics into their own refl ections, thereby connecting legal theory 
with the long tradition of reasoning about the intell ect, which was ultimately 
rooted in Avicenna (Davidson 1992, 83 -94; McGinnis 2010, 117-130)49 but also 
shared by al-Ghazali (Davidson 1992, 129-144; Treiger 2012, 18-29).50 
The example is taken from a text written by the Ottoman author Mulla Khus- 
raw (d. 885/1480 or 1481). He was one of the eminent scholars working under the 
patronage of Mehmed II and was appointed by him zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAqiir;lf of Consta tinople as 
well as professor at the Ayasofya madrasa, to mention only his most prestigious 
positions.51 Mulla Khusraw wrote several works on usul al-fi qh, among them a 
handbook call ed The Stairs to Arriving (Mirqiit al-wusul) and a commentary on 
it entitl ed The Mirror of the Principles on Commenting The Stairs to Arriving 
(Mir'iit al-usii l zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfi sharh Mirqiit al-wusuli. Whereas the former is an extremely 
short aide memoire to the standard issues to be taught in classes about usul 
4 8 See Hallaq 1990, 372 who emphasises that later scholars went several steps beyond al- 
Ghazali in integrating the formal precepts of logic into the body of legal theory; compare Street 
2004, 558-559; EI-Rouayheb 2016, 414, 416-424. 
49 For a more detailed account of Avicenna's epistemology, see Gutas 2000. Of course, impor- 
tant reflections on the intellect were already presented by earlier philosophers such as al-Kindl 
and al-Farabi, but the terminology of the text to be discussed in the following is unequivocall y 
Avicennan. 
50 As mentioned, this does not apply to the Mustasft: but to other writings by al-Ghazali such as 
the Mfzan and the lhya' (compare above n. 45). 
5 1 For biographical details, see Repp 1986, 128- 137, 154- 166; Reinhart 2007, 2-13; Arslan 2016, 
39- 46. On Mulla Khusraw's writings and his doctrine, see the proceedings of the symposium 
held at Bursa in 2011 which have been edited by Yucedogru 2013. 
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al-fi qh, the latter gives an elaborate account of the same topics,52 containing a 
number of inspiring and unexpected reflections.53 
One of these reflections focuses on the question of how to define a legal sub- 
ject zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(al-mukallaf) r, as the t xt puts it, how to define "someone to whom the 
assessment applies" tal-mahkiun 'alayhi) (Mulla Khusraw 1307, 2:239.2, 1309, 
2:432.10). Since this topic had already been treated numerous times in former 
usu! a/-fiqh writings, one would not expect anything unconventional under this 
title. Despite being perfectly aware of the scholarly tradition, Mulla Khusraw 
nonetheless prefers to address the issue in a new way. This becomes evident 
from the very beginning of his presentation. In the Mirqat, that is, the handbook, 
he introduces the topic as follows: "[Chapter] On someone to whom the assess- 
ment applies, that is, a legal subject: the fact of being a legal subject (al-taklff) 
depends on the basic legal capacity (al-ahliyya) [of a person] which in tum 
depends on the [fact that he possesses a] dispositional intellect (al- 'aql bi'l- 
malakai,"?" 
Presented in this terse form the statement would probably have been incom- 
prehensible to his readers. Therefore Mulla Khusraw hastens to explain it by 
proffering a long commentary, this time in the Mir'iit: his explanation starts 
with a rough exposition of the philosophical or, more precisely, Avicennan 
theory of intellect. Accordingly we are told that the term 'aqt, as used in philo- 
sophical language, points to a faculty of the soul which enables us to gain 
knowledge and to act according to our deliberations. As Mulla Khusraw (1307, 
2:239.6-12; 1309, 2:432.12- 23) explains, this faculty comprises two aspects 
which may be called "theoretical intellect" ('aql nazarii and "practical intellect" 
('aql 'amaiii . The theoretical intellect in its tum is not uniform but exists in four 
different stages (maratib) depending upon the degree to which our soul has been 
able to receive abstracted forms and to grasp the intelli gibles. These stages are 
called: (1) "material intellect'" ('aql hayillanf), meaning the rational soul at the 
52 On both texts, see Reinhart 2007, 14-15; Arslan 2016, 51- 54. Arslan 2016, 85-261 gives a par· 
tial German translation of the Mirqat but his translation does not cover the part which is of par- 
ticular interest for us. 
53 The text was available to me in two versions: (1) a facsimile of a manuscript of the Mir'at 
published in Istanbul in 1307 AH; and (2) on the margin of Sulayman b. 'Abdallah al-Izmirl 's 
glosses U1ashiya) on the Mir'at printed in Istanbul in 1309 AH. I owe both these versions to 
A. Kevin Reinhart who presented the text at a workshop on "Islamic Legal Theories in the 
Late Post-Classical Period" convened by Asad Q. Ahmed at UC Berkeley on September 29-0cto- 
ber 1, 2017. I want to express my thanks to Asad Ahmed for inviting me to the workshop and to 
Kevin Reinhard for providing me with copies of the text and sharing with me important infor- 
mation about Mulla Khusraw. 
54 Mirqat al-wusul as quoted in brackets in Mulla Khusraw 1307, 2:239.3- 6; 1309, 2:432.10 -12. 
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very beginning of its created nature zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(fi zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAmabda' al-fitra) when it is still devoid of 
any object of knowledge; (2) "dispositional intell ect" ('aql bi'l-malaka), the stage 
when our intell ect has grasped those objects of knowledge which are self-evident 
(li ke the so-call ed "laws of thought") and is thus disposed to attain further the- 
oretical knowledge (ista'addat l i -tahsi ! al-nazariyyat); (3) "actual intell ect" ('aq/ 
bi'l-fi'I), the intell ect that has acquired theoretical knowledge and has access 
to it whenever it wants but does not consider it at the moment; and (4) "acquired 
intell ect" ('aql mustafiid), the highest stage of human intell ect, coming about 
when the intell igible forms are actuall y present in the soul (Mulla Khusraw 
1307, 2:239.12- 240.6; 1309, 2:432.23 - 32). 55 
Having accompli shed this expositi on, Mulla Khusraw continues his presen- 
tation by emphasising the parall els between phil osophical noetics and juridical 
theory. His elaboration on this point is long and mult ifarious, evoking several 
concepts such as dhimma ("legal protection") and the Qur'anic amana 
("trust") which need not be explained here in detail. However, the major point 
of his argument seems to be clear. It consists of declaring that two stages of 
(the phil osophical theory of) the intell ect just mentioned are relevant wi thin 
the conceptual framework of jurisprudence: the "material intell ect" and the "dis- 
positional intell ect". 
Both of them are somehow connected to our legal capacity, named in Arabic 
by the generic term ahliyya. The ahliyya exists in two forms (naw'ani) which are 
to be understood as two stages: (a) a kind of necessary or basic capacity (ahliyyat 
al-wujiib) and (b) the capacity to act (ahliyyat al-ada'i (Mulla Khusraw 1307, 
2:243.4-8; 1309, 2:434.4-6). The fi rst one appli es to human beings from the 
very beginning of their existence, that is, already in their embryonic state 
(janfn) (Mulla Khusraw 1307, 2:244.10; 1309, 2:434.29). It entails certain basic 
rights such as the right of inheriting (irth) (Mulla Khusraw 1307, 2:244.12-13; 
1309, 2:434.31) and is itself related to the fact that we are rational beings. This 
does not mean that the ahliyyat al-wujub is to be identifi ed wi th our intell ect 
but it relies on the intell ect because the fact that human beings are endowed 
with a (material) intell ect is a necessary condition (shart) of its existence 
(Mulla Khusraw 1307, 2:243.18-244.4; 1309, 2:434.14-24). By contrast, the second 
ahliyya is the characteristic feature of a legal subject (mukallaf). It is our capacity 
of acting according to moral obli gations and of being responsible for our own 
acts (Mull a Khusraw 1307, 2:243.7- 8; 1309, 2:434.6). This capacity presupposes 
that, having grasped the basic laws of thought, we have become able to refl ect zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
55 For Avicenna's theory which is the model of Mulla Khusraw's exposition, see Davidson 1992, 
83- 87; McGinnis 2010 , 118-120. 
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on our own and to attain knowledge. In other words, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAahliyyat al-ada' is, in phil - 
osophical terminology, nothing but our dispositional intellect ('aql bi'l-malaka) 
(Mulla Khusraw 1307, 2:240.6-241.8; 1309, 2:432.32-433.8). This may be surpris- 
ing for religious scholars and certainly hard to accept. However, Mulla Khusraw 
(1307, 2:241.8-10; 1309, 2:433.8-9) insists on this identification by telli ng his col- 
leagues that "even if something just mentioned may be taken from the teaching 
of the philosophers, it obviously does not contradict the doctrine of the ah/ a/- 
sunna as expressed by the theologians (al-mutakallimiln)." 
Without doubt Mulla Khusraw's reflections on legal capacity and the stages 
of human intellect need further investigation. So far, we lack several pieces of 
information which would allow us to better understand his argument and situate 
it within the context both of his own doctrine and the legal discourse of his time. 
What we do know, however, is that he merged philosophy with jurisprudence. 
And, as we have just seen, his way of combining the two went far beyond any 
of al-Ghazali 's attempts in this field. These observations are instructive all the 
more as both of them confirm the twofold conclusion already expressed before: 
al-Ghazali seems to have been successful in promoting the merging of philo- 
sophical with juridical reasoning, but later scholars seem to have been more suc- 
cessful in realising this goal. zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Appendix 
Table 1: The classification of the sciences according to Book One of JJ:iya' 'ulilm 
al-din (The Revival of the Sciences of Religion), that is, Kitiib al- 'Jim (The Book of 
Knowledge); the classification comprises the sciences characterised by al-Ghazali 
as incumbent on the community as a whole (far(,i al-kifiiya). 
I. Non-religious (ghayr shar'iyya) sciences: 
1. Praiseworthy imahmuda): medicine, arithmetic, agriculture, weaving, 
politics etc. 
2. Blameworthy (madhmilma): magic, science of the talismans, science of 
trickery and deception 
3. Permissible (muba.J:i): science of poetry, historiography etc. 
II. Religious (shar'iyya) sciences (which are all praiseworthy because of their 
prophetic origin but may contain blameworthy elements in practice intro- 
duced at a later stage): 
1. Principles/Sources (u$ill): Qur'an, Surma, consensus of the community 
(ijmii '), traditions of the Prophet's companions (iithiir al-sahiiba) 
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2. Branches zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(Jun1'): 
a. Science of this world ('ilm al-dunyd): jurisprudence (fiqh) 
b. Science of the path to the hereafter ('ilm tariq al-tikhira) 
i. Science of unveiling ('ilm al-mukashafa) 
ii. Science of [right] practice ('ilm al-mu'amalai or science of the 
states of the heart ('ilm a}:lwal al-qalb) 
3. Preliminaries tmuqadimmati: lexicography (lugha), grammar (na}:lw) 
4. Supplements tmutammimats. 
a. Related to the Qur'an: 
i. Concerning its expression (laf:?): readings (qira'at), letters 
(/:luruf) 
ii. Concerning its meaning (ma'na): exegesis (tafsfr), principles of 
jurisprudence (u$ill al-fiqh) 
b. Related to the Surina: science of the transmitters ('ilm al-riiat), prin- 
ciples of jurisprudence (u$D.l al-fiqh) 
Table 2: The classification of the sciences according to the Exordium iKhutbo) of 
al-Mustasfi: min 'ilm al-usul (The Distillation of the Science of the Principles [of 
Jurisprudence]) 
I. Purely rational ('aq/f ma}:lc;l) sciences: 
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy etc. 
II. Purely traditional (naq/f mahd) sciences: 
exegesis (tafsfr) of the Qur'an, sciences of the haditn etc. 
III . Combined (ma izdawaja [ihi al- 'aql wa-1-sam ') sciences: 
jurisprudence (fiqh), principles of jurisprudence (u$D.l al-fiqh) etc. 
Table 3: The classification of the sciences according to the Preface (Sadr) of al- 
Mustasfa min 'i lm ai-usul (The Distillation of the Science of the Principles [of 
Jurisprudence]) 
I. Rational ('aqliyya) sciences: 
medicine, arithmetic, geometry etc. 
II. Religious (dfniyya) sciences: 
1. Universal (kulliyya): theology tkalam), science of the hidden ('ilm al- 
ba.tin) or science of the heart i'ilm al-qalb) 
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2. Particular tjuz'iyya): jurisprudence zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(fiqh), principles of jurisprudence 
(u$ii.l al-fiqh), sciences of the hadith, exegesis (tafsfr) of the Qur'an etc. 
Table 4: The structure of al-Mustasfa min 'il m al-usii l (The Distillation of the 
Science of the Principles [of Jurisprudence]) 
Introduction (Muqaddima): The epistemological fundaments of the theoretical 
sciences tmadank al-tulii m al-nazariyya) 
Part 1: Legal assessment ial-hukm; 
Part 2: The sources of legal assessments (u$ii.l al-ahkam) 
Part 3: The proofs for legal assessments (adillat al-ahkarn) 
Part 3: The conditions for being a legal scholar (mujtahid) 
Table 5: Description and classifi cation of the sciences according to the Introduc- 
tion of Ibn Rushd's Epitome of the "Distillation" (Mukhta$ar al-Musta$fti.) 
I. Theoretical Science: 
Its goal (ghti.ya) is a beli ef (i'tiqad) emerging in the soul; it deals wi th ques- 
tions such as atoms ial-iuz' alladhi la yatajazza') and the creation of the 
world in time (f_zuduth al- 'ti.lam). 
[Identifi cation: 
a. Within the reli gious sciences: kalam 
b. Within philosophy (as mentioned in further classifi cations of the scien- 
ces by Ibn Rushd): metaphysics and physics] 
II . Practical Science: 
Its goal is action ('amal). 
1. Universal: 
It deals wi th legal assessments ial-ahkdm), the sources of legal assess- 
ments (u$ii.l al-ahkam) such as the Qur'an, the Surina, and the consensus 
of the community, as well as the conditions for being a legal scholar (al- 
mujtahid). 
[Identifi cation: 
a. Within the reli gious sciences: usul al-fiqli 
b. Within phil osophy: ethics] 
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2. Particular: 
It deals with the furii ' and the duties zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA(al-fara'ic)) incu bent on every 
believer. 
[Identification: 
a. Within the religious sciences: zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBAfiqh 
b. Within philosophy: politics] 
III . Instrumental Sciences: 
It deals with the rules of reasoning as applied in theoretical and practical 
science, e.g. the proofs for legal assessments (adi/lat al-ahkam). 
[Identification: 
a. Within the religious sciences: usii l al-fiqti 
b. Within philosophy: logic] 
